Canadian Military History
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 13

1994

Assault on Calais: 25 September–1 October 1944
W.H.V. Matthews

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh
Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthews, W.H.V. "Assault on Calais: 25 September–1 October 1944." Canadian Military History 3, 2
(1994)

This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more
information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Matthews: Assault on Calais

by Major W.H.V. Matthews, MC and Bar, Officer Commanding,
"A" Company, 1st Canadian Scottish Regiment to Historical
Officer, 19 October 1944

Channel Ports of BOULOGNE and CALAIS,
the first determined resistance was offered to
the rapid advance along the coast. There was
no question of the garrisons joining in the
general retreat; rather they prepared for a
siege in order to deny the Allies the use of
these valuable prizes as long as possible.
Although their avowed decision was to fight
to the death, still this heroic mood existed
almost exclusively in the hearts of those who
exercised c o m m a n d , a n d was not the
prevailing characteristic of either garrison.
The capture of BOULOGNE ( 17-22 September
1944) confirmed that fact.
Despite
certain
similarities
of
c i r c u m s t a n c e , t h e c a p t u r e of CALAIS
presented a very different problem from that
of BOULOGNE. Whereas the latter fortress
had based its defence on the prominent
features which enclosed it, CALAIS could
show no comparable eminence of land, and
its defence was in fact dependent on water
o b s t a c l e s a n d low, m a r s h y g r o u n d .
Inundation had greatly added to the difficulty
of attacking the city.
Only on the west side was the terrain
judged to be favourable, owing to a prominent
feature, BELLE VUE RIDGE, which, from its
highest point at NOIRES MOTTES, r u n s
eastward towards the flooded ground around
the city. This area was in enemy hands. On
the east and south the ground was considered
to be too low and marshy to permit a successful
initial attack. The enemy moreover possessed
complete command of these approaches.

substantially the case at BOULOGNE. Within
the city itself were many canals, well-defended,
which divided it into islands, and imposed
further obstacles.
The enemy had positioned himself in the
following areas around the city: ESCALLES NOIRES MOTTES; BELLE VUE RIDGE; VIEUX
COQUELLES' LES BARAQUES; and at the
eastern and southeastern approaches. The
garrison was made up of Army, Navy and Air
Force personnel, as in BOULOGNE, and was
commanded
by
Lieutenant-Colonel
Schroeder, himself a naval officer. Its strength
was a first judged to be from 4,500 to 5,500.
The surprising total of PW from BOULOGNE
(nearly 10,000) caused a later revision of this
estimate which brought it to around 7,000.
This was fairly accurate.
Throughout the siege and attack on
BOULOGNE the investment of CALAIS had
been left principally to 7th Canadian Recce
Regiment, with the Toronto Scottish Regiment
(Machine Gun) on the east flank. Initially,
7th C a n a d i a n Recce Regiment gave its
attention to CAP GRIS NEZ, for which it was
responsible, finally leaving light mobile forces
to contain that area when it moved to a
position southwest of CALAIS on 18 September
1944. With the fall of BOULOGNE 8th
Canadian Infantry Brigade moved to its left
flank, facing CALAIS, and 9th Canadian
Infantry Brigade took over the siege of CAP
GRIS NEZ. The eastern sector of the CALAIS
perimeter was taken over by the Cameron
Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) from the Toronto
Scottish Regiment (MG).

Nor could the problem be solved with the
reduction of the outer defences alone, as was
89
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Left: German coastal battery
at Cap Blanc Nez west of
Calais. This photograph puts
into perspective the size of the
bomb craters on the ground,
the size and depth of which
can be deceiving when seen
on aerial photographs.
CFPU PMR 84-12
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7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
Groups were to make the assault from the
southwest, first wresting from the enemy the
desirable high ground. They were to be
supported by armour, artillery and heavy
bombing. The inter-brigade boundary, all
inclusive to 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade,
commencing its attack with two battalions
up, was to capture BELLE VUE, COQUELLES
and CALAIS. 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
on the left had the task of capturing the
ESCALLES and NOIRES MOTTES area,
likewise advancing on a two-battalion front;
its third battalion was to be in reserve. The
taking of the ESCALLES feature, which
overlooked CALAIS, was essential for the
success of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
The air plan envisaged heavy bombing on
the CALAIS area, the target circumference
decreasing each time as our troops advanced.
For the artillery fire plan the same method
was adopted as used so successfully at
BOULOGNE, i.e. a generous allotment of
concentrations, both pin-point and linear, (A
linear concentration is usually known as a
stonk or straight cone. ) on all potential sources
of opposition.
On the morning of 25 September 1944 the
operation began. Royal Winnipeg Rifles on
the right advanced towards COQUELLES and
Regina Rifles on the left on BELLE VUE
RIDGE.
1st Canadian Scottish Regiment
were to go through later to the coast area to
destroy the strongpoints there.
While the first objectives were being
attacked, 1st Canadian Scottish Regiment
remained in the vicinity of BONNINGUESLES-CALAIS, awaiting orders to move forward.
Late in the afternoon the battalion rode up in
Kangaroos to PEUPLINGUE, and proceeded
from there to the wooded area on BELLE VUE
RIDGE. From the height "A" and "C" Company
Commanders surveyed the ground to the
north j u s t before dark.
Weather conditions had deteriorated sadly
and it was a wet and miserable night as "A"
and "C" Company Commanders set out to
recce the area of LA GRANDE COUR. The foul
weather caused them to lose their way more

than once and a special difficulty arose from
the fact that the track shown on the maps as
running from BELLE VUE to LA GRANDE
COUR simply did not exist. Stumbling through
the darkness, the officers commenced to follow
a track which they assumed to be the right
one, only to find themselves eventually in
SANGATTE, well in front of the forward troops.
They withdrew hurriedly, for there was
abundant evidence of the enemy's presence
there. Somewhat discouraged after several
more fruitless attempts to locate the farm,
they returned to Regina Rifle Battalion HQ. A
report had now come in that LA GRANDE
COUR was a difficult position, so the idea of
using it as a base was abandoned, and it was
proposed to establish a foothold in SANGATTE
itself around first light.
Near daylight on 26 S e p t e m b e r "A"
Company advanced quickly into SANGATTE
and settled itself without much opposition
near the church. "C" Company was following
some distance behind. One platoon of "A"
Company moved to the west to deal with a
blockhouse, which they cleared quickly. Major
Matthews, taking stock of the area, observed
movement on NOIRES MOTTES, around the
three cross-channel guns. A few rounds fired
in that direction produced a vigorous show of
white flags.
Captain Gillan, 2 i / c "A"
Company, went up to investigate and the
garrison of the battery position surrendered
to him. The huge 406 mm guns were out of
action, and the German gunners, awaiting an
opportunity to surrender, were mostly in a
state of inebriation. This curious phenomenon
in enemy garrison troops had been met with
before, in BOULOGNE.
When "C" Company arrived in SANGATTE
there commenced a lengthy lead-frogging
process eastwards along the coast road
towards CALAIS. "C" Company, passing
through "A" worked its way up to the road
fork. Here they became the target of an
inaccurate, but disturbing, enemy flamet h r o w e r , w h i c h slowed t h e i r a d v a n c e
temporarily. "A" Company, following behind,
encountered and cleared a strongpoint. "C"
Company then continued its sweeping process
up to LE CRAN.
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"A" Company now moved ahead, taking
out two strongpoints in the sand dunes at the
left of the road in LE CRAN. The area up to
TROUILLE FARM was cleared and the two
platoons of "A" Company advanced into LES
BARAQUES. They found the village almost
completely flattened by bombing. One went
to the church, while the other, turning left,
proceeded to attack FORT LAPIN. After a
brisk fight, one fort was captured, with some
50-60 PW. It was discovered, however, that
the area consisted of not one, but several
forts, so that the bulk of the defences had still
to be overcome. Before this process, which
they had begun so well, could be continued,
the order was given to withdraw, since they
were too near the target area of a proposed
heavy bombing attack. All forward troops
were drawn back to TROUILLE FARM while
the bombing took place. On the west, 8th
C a n a d i a n Infantry Brigade had by now
completed its task without having employed
its reserve battalion.
In the afternoon of the next day, Major
Matthews and a FOO went forward to lay
plans for the capture of FORT LAPIN, in
which tanks and artillery were to be employed.
To reach a suitable point of vantage, the recce
party had to cross an open stretch across the
s a n d d u n e s , during which time enemy
machine guns raked the area, hitting no one
however. The OP officer now found his wireless
set out of order and the artillery support
consequently not available.
The tanks of 6th Canadian Armoured
Regiment meanwhile were near TROUILLE
FARM and already blasting the forts from
there. As yet they could go no further. Both
infantry and armour were waiting to attack.
There was an uncomfortable moment as the
tanks commenced to move forward, for there
was no way to inform them of the hitch in
plans. As they drew level, however, they
came to a stop, and engaged enemy positions
while the targets were indicated to them by
shouting. One fort was set on fire by their
shells.
At dusk the infantry crossed the road to
the north and the armour eased back. A

silent attack was launched on FORT LAPIN.
One platoon of "A" Company under a sergeant
wriggled into the fort area and took out the
nearest strongpoint.
Their p r i s o n e r s
announced that the remainder would quit,
given some encouragement. The platoon
therefore went on to the next fort, while a
second passed through it to take out others.
The third went on to LES BARAQUES to
secure that village.
The plan now envisaged "C" Company
following "A", and "B" Company going through
on the left into the citadel of CALAIS, using
pontoon bridging to cross the water obstacles.
Simultaneously "D" Company was to swing
through on the right, using collapsible boats,
and likewise enter the citadel. In the final
phase, the entire battalion was to consolidate
within the citadel.
Two platoons of "A" Company in FORT
LAPIN soon had captured the whole area,
including its commander. The inevitable
hospital, with medical officer and patients,
also fell into their hands. The third platoon
oc the company met sterner opposition in
LES BARAQUES and was pinned down by
fire until "C" Company entered the village, at
which time by their combined weight they
succeeded in clearing it almost to its eastern
edge. On the right "D" Company now worked
out to the railway bridge. The majority crossed
over unhindered and commenced to form up
prior to attacking the citadel. But they
suddenly came under severe shelling from
"Bastion 11", from the citadel itself and from
their right. Thus caught they were pinned to
the ground and could not withdraw owing to
the intensity of the fire.
"B" Company meanwhile had attempted
to cross north of the railway bridge close to
the bastion. But the forward platoon was
likewise immobilized by fire directly in front
of its walls. The rear platoons were still free
and were sent to the right to cross the canal
by "D" Company's route. This they succeeded
in doing and were of course at once in the
same unhappy situation. "C" Company had
also sent a platoon to follow "D" and it too was
pinned.

92
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol3/iss2/13

4

Matthews: Assault on Calais

This air photo shows the northwest environs of Calais attacked by the Canadian Scottish Regiment at the end
of September. At the top left can be seen Fort Lapin and Les Baraques where "A" and "C" Companies were
established. Between Bastion 11 (top centre) and the Citadel (partly visible at right) was the area where "B" and
"D " Companies were trapped.
WLU Air Photo 184/4181
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At 0300 hours, 28 Sep, the battalion
picture was not a bright one. "A" Company
had two platoons in FORT LAPIN, and one
platoon and company HQ in LES BARAQUES
waiting to go forward. "B" Company had one
platoon and its company HQ pinned down to
the right of the road before the bastion; its
o t h e r two p l a t o o n s were in t h e s a m e
predicament beyond the railway bridge near
the citadel. Nearly all of "D" Company was
pinned down beyond the bridge. One platoon
of "C" Company was in the same area; the
other two with company HQ were under very
heavy fire in LES BARAQUES. Tactical
Battalion HQ was now also located in LES
BARAQUES, h a v i n g moved t h e r e from
TROUILLE FARM.
Even that town was
uncomfortable, with machine gun rounds
whistling through the streets, and Battalion
HQ shortly returned to the farm. "A" Company
moved its HQ to FORT LAPIN. In effect only
one company—"A" Company—had freedom
of movement.
Towards morning "B" and "D" Companies
made attempts to extricate themselves without
success. Communications had by now fallen
down badly. Somewhat later "A" Company
cleared the enemy from the strongpoints
between FORT LAPIN and the bastion, thus
relieving the pressure on "C" Company in LES
BARAQUES; patrols from "C" Company
succeeded in bringing food to "D" Company
near the citadel.
In the evening of 28 Sep, LieutenantColonel Schroeder, the garrison commander,
requested a parley at 1000 hours, 29 Sep.
Firing ceased. On the following morning, a 24
hours' truce was declared to allow civilians to
leave CALAIS. The garrison commander had
refused to surrender.
Inasmuch as international conventions
permit no regrouping of forward troops during
the period of the armistice it was not possible
even to withdraw the two companies whose
positions were so isolated. Prior to the parlay,
however, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, the
reserve battalion of 8th Canadian Infantry
Brigade, had already stationed themselves
on the eastern perimeter of CALAIS, and
plans were now formed to launch an attack

from that sector on 30 Sep, when the armistice
had expired. Their intention was to capture
or destroy all enemy up to the line of the canal
just east of grid line 89. Another massive air
attack and an extensive artillery programme
were prepared to lend weight to the final
blow. While this attack was in progress 7th
Canadian Infantry Brigade was to eliminate
enemy posts in front of its battalion positions
prior to the resumption of the main assault
against the city. In this second phase 1st
Canadian Scottish Regiment was to capture
CALAIS NORD; Royal Winnipeg Rifles and
Regina Rifles were to capture CALAIS SUD.
At the same time Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
and Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa were to
clear eastern CALAIS to the line of the next
canal.
For 1st Canadian Scottish Regiment this
meant that "A" Company, being the only
unrestricted sub-unit, should first capture
the bastion and that after dark all companies
should surge forward into CALAIS.
At 1200 hours, 30 Sep, the attack was
begun. "A" Company sent a platoon under
Lieutenant Milton to the right into the bastion,
aide by Crocodiles. With this support they
were successful in breaking into the bastion
area and proceeded to clear it. Amongst its
earthworks — relics of an older fort—the enemy
had
constructed
dug-in
concrete
emplacements.
During this time smoke was laid between
the bastion and the fort at 854787. When it
was observed that the first platoon had
achieved partial success on the right, a second
platoon, under Lieutenant Chambers,
attacked the fort on the left. It was cleared
quickly so that Lieutenant Chambers was
able to join Lieutenant Milton in the bastion
where fighting was still going on. This too
was soon captured.
With its fall a succession of white flags
appeared in a long line from enemy posts
right up to FORT RISBAN. In the bastion "A"
Company hoisted its own flag, presented by
the Princess Royal, above the swastika,
thereby offending many Germans, as it later
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appeared. The CO came up and decided to
exploit the success thus gained, without
waiting for darkness. "C" Company was
ordered to advance through "A" Company.
This it did, crossing by the railway bridge
to the citadel, and freeing "D" and "B"
Companies, who had been pinned there for so
long. All three companies now continued to
move i n t o CALAIS NORD, w h i c h was
thoroughly demolished. As a final measure
"C" Company crossed the avant port by the
bridge at 875789 to clear the quay to the
north. At its tip was a fort still in enemy

hands, whose commander, while ready to
surrender, insisted on doing so to the CO.
This was arranged and at 0300 hours, 1
October 1944, the German commander and
his men departed as prisoners of war.
Lieutenant-Colonel Schroeder had already
surrendered to Cameron Highlanders of
Ottawa, and Regina Rifles and Royal Winnipeg
Rifles had occupied CALAIS SUD, Queen's
Own Rifles of C a n a d a a n d C a m e r o n
Highlanders of Ottawa had advanced to the
line of the canal which was their objective.
The capture of CALAIS was complete.
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